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THE THIRD WAY OF PROBABILITY & STATISTICS:
BEYOND TESTING AND ESTIMATION TO
IMPORTANCE, RELEVANCE, AND SKILL
WILLIAM M. BRIGGS
Abstract. There is a third way of implementing probability mod-
els and practicing. This is to answer questions put in terms of
observables. This eliminates frequentist hypothesis testing and
Bayes factors and it also eliminates parameter estimation. The
Third Way is the logical probability approach, which is to make
statements Pr(Y ∈ y|X,D,M) about observables of interest Y
taking values y, given probative data X, past observations (when
present) D and some model (possibly deduced) M . Significance
and the false idea that probability models show causality are no
more, and in their place are importance and relevance. Models are
built keeping on information that is relevant and important to a
decision maker (and not a statistician). All models are stated in
publicly verifiable fashion, as predictions. All models must undergo
a verification process before any trust is put into them.
1. Introduction
Testing and estimation, whether in the frequentist or Bayesian im-
plementations, form the backbone of classical analyses. This is unfor-
tunate because the questions answered by testing and estimation are
not of interest to anyone except statisticians. A typical question would
be, “How is age related to the uncertainty in contracting cancer of the
albondigas?” The tactic is to say whether the p-value in a parameter-
ized probability model relating age and cancer was wee, or to say that
a Bayes factor for the same parameter has a certain value, or by stat-
ing an estimate of that unobservable parameter. These are obviously
not answers to the question. Error is introduced, and on a breathtak-
ing scale, by supposing the classical statements are the answer. This
happens in almost all published instances of statistical analysis.
Disputes in statistics center around Bayesian versus frequentist meth-
ods. While there is a wide chasm between the interpretation of prob-
ability in these two philosophies, the practical differences are minor.
Both methods devote themselves to parameters. Yet parameters are
of no direct interest in answering questions about the uncertainty of
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observables (such as cancer of the albondigas). However, a doleful
tradition has developed which says they are. If a p-value is wee, or
a Bayes factor large, or a parameter estimate a certain value, uncer-
tainty in the observable is thought to be adequately quantified. But
this is not so: no matter how much certainty is present in parameters,
the uncertainty in the observable must always be greater. Therefore
relying on parameter-certainty as a proxy for observable-certainty is to
be over-confident.
Some have noticed this discrepancy, such as Seymour Geisser, see
[Geisser, 1993, Geisser, 1984], but knowledge of his work is limited,
hampered, no doubt, by lacking a well-articulated replacement for the
classical methods. The Third Way proposed below is (it is hoped)
such a replacement. To maintain consistency the interpretation of
philosophy is as logic is adopted. This is expounded in, among oth-
ers, [Jaynes, 2003, Cox, 1961, Keynes, 2004, de Laplace, 1996] as well
as philosophically in [Campbell and Franklin, 2004, Franklin, 2001a,
Franklin, 2001b]. Those familiar with objective Bayes will recognize
many mathematical parallels, e.g. [Williamson, 2010] (although this
author does not cross over into full logical probability). The only piece
of philosophy necessary to grasp the basics of logical probability is to
recognize that all probability is conditional. That is, there is no such
thing as unconditional probability of any proposition.1
The gist of the Third Way is simple: answer the questions put to us
about the uncertainty in observables. Eliminate all talk of parameters,
all notion of testing, and all manner of estimation. If somebody asks,
“How is age related to the uncertainty in contracting cancer of the
albondigas?”, we tell them.
2. The Third Way
Let past observables be labeled D = (Y,X)old, where Y is the ob-
servable in which we want to quantify or explain our uncertainty, and
X are the premises or observables assumed probative of Y (the di-
mensions of each will be obvious in context). Let the premises which
lead to a probability model (if one is present) be labeled M . And let
X = Xnew be the premises or assumed values of new observables. The
goal of all probability modeling is this:
Pr(Y ∈ y|X,D,M), (1)
1The skeptical reader is invited to try to discover the probability of a proposition
that relies on no evidence.
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where y are values of the observable Y which are of interest to some
decision maker. Models should be rare, because most probability is not
quantifiable—and we must resist the temptation to force quantification
by making up scientific-sounding numbers. But even if we do, (1)
can be calculated, as long as supply the premises which led to our
creations.2
Although it is obvious, the equation reads, “The probability Y takes
the values y given the premises or assumptions X, the past data D, and
the model M .” If the model is parameterized and Bayesian philosophy
is adopted, (1) is the posterior predictive distribution, and M incorpo-
rates those premises or assumptions from which the priors are deduced
(see e.g. [Bernardo and Smith, 2000]). If a frequentist philosophy is
adopted, there are many difficulties and inconsistencies in interpreta-
tion, but I will not discuss them here; the meaning of equation is plain
enough. The key is that no parameters are explicit in (1); the uncer-
tainty in them has been “integrated out.” Only observables and plain
assumptions remain. Logical probability would supply premises from
which the model M is deduced (there would be no parameters thus no
priors).
Equation (1) eliminates, or rather combines, the efforts of testing and
estimation into one form. The focus is entirely on observables and the
assumptions made and their effect on the uncertainty of not-yet-seen
or unknown values of Y . Not-yet-seen values of Y are those unknown
or assumed unknown; usually they are as yet unmeasured, e.g. in the
future.
A simple example is a die roll in which M = “This is a six-sided
object with labels one through six and which when tossed must show
only one side.” The model is deduced based on these premises. There
is no X probative beyond M and D can be absent or can be a record
of previous flips (i.e. X and D are null or are assumed not probative).
An application of (1) is Pr(Y = 6|X,D,M) = 1/6. Because the model
was deduced, no parameters were ever present.
It is unfortunately rare that models are deduced; most are posited
ad hoc. That is, M is usually “I’m using regression”, i.e. an act of will.
Model deduction can be accomplished if the measurement of observable
are properly accounted for. See Briggs [Briggs, 2016] for details. Since
that problem takes us too far afield, I’ll stick with arbitrary or capri-
cious models. Suppose we are interested in Y = “First-year college
grade point average” of students. Observations X thought probative
2Readers are asked to express their agreement with this proposition on a scale
of -1.74 to epi.
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are the high school grade point average and SAT score. The model M
will be ordinary regression. The goal is to produce statements like this:
Pr(Y > 3.8|Xh = 3.5, Xs = 1160, D,M), (2)
where the subscript “h” is for high school GPA, and “s” is for SAT.
The D are past observations. Since regression uses continuous normal
probability, we unfortunately cannot ask about observables like “Y =
4.0” and must restrict our attention to intervals.
At any rate, the main questions of interest are only two: (1) how
do changing values of Xh and Xs change the uncertainty in Y in the
presence of D, M , and y, and (2) of what value or descriptive power is
M? M includes Xh and Xs as components.
There is no notion of “significance” in either of these questions, and
no notion of correctness in any instance where the model was not de-
duced. All probability is conditional, and that means the probabilities
given in equations like 2 are correct. If, at some later point, it is de-
cided that Xs is of no interest and the model is updated to reflect this,
then the probabilities derived from the new model are also correct. One
model may be superior to another, however, but only with respect to
decisions made conditional on the models.
There is more work to be done by model builders in the Third Way
because values of y must also be chosen, and so do values of X. This
implies a model may be useful in some decision contexts and of no
use or even harmful in others. There is and should be no default or
automatic levels of usefulness. The last thing the field of probability
and statistics needs is another magic number a la “significance” with
p-values.
The importance of probative observables and assumptions X is thus
also a matter of decision and cannot be made automatically. This is
plain from equation (1), which encapsulates all we know about Y given
our assumptions. It is we who made these assumptions, and we who
can change them. Again, the only ultimately true model of Y is that
which is deduced from true premises, as in the die example. Every
other model is therefore only useful or not conditional on the premises
we assume. Since most models are ad hoc, as regression always is, we
can only speak of usefulness. Deduced models are true by definition and
thus nothing more need be done with them except make predictions.
Deduced models do not even need to be verified.
The idea in the Third Way is, conditional on D and M , to vary X
in the range of expected, decisionable, or important values to some
decision maker and see how these change the probability of Y ∈ y. If
a particular X as it ranges along the values we choose do not change
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the probabilities of Y ∈ y in any important way, then these X are
themselves not important. The opposite is also true. Importance is a
matter of decision, which varies by decision maker. Importance is not
a probability or statistical concept and therefore cannot be ascertained
within probability models. If the probability of Y ∈ y changes in any
as X does, then that X is relevant to understanding Y , else it is not.
Relevance is a probabilistic concept, but as the reader will see, it is
almost always present given the assumption that the X is causally
related to the Y . If X is known not be causally related to Y , then X
is irrelevant by definition.
There is no hypothesis testing in the frequentist or Bayesian sense
(as implied by Bayes factors, for instance). And there is no estimation
of parameters. There are only plain, understandable, and verifiable
probability statements. These probability statements can and should
and must be verified. The Third Way allows communication of model
goodness and usefulness in an intelligible, actionable manner. It re-
duces over-certainty but cannot eliminate it unless models are deduced.
3. Example
There are 100 observations of first-year college students’ grade point
averages. We want to quantify the uncertainty in the GPAs of new
students given these observations, and also given information thought
probative, in this case high school GPAs and SAT scores.3 We assume
an ad hoc ordinary regression model. If we adopt the Bayesian philos-
ophy, we need priors, and here an assumption of “flat” priors will do.
As is well known, in ordinary regression this assumption matches the
answers given by frequentist philosophy. But it doesn’t matter. Any
premises that give different priors will do. Our purpose here is not
(directly) investigating priors, but the uncertainty inherent in Y given
the assumptions we make.
It turns out
Pr(Y > 3.8|Xh = 3.5, Xs = 1160, D,Mh,s) = 0.038. (3)
Notice that the dependence of the model on the assumptions has been
annotated, as it always should be. If, given D, we insist on M and
on the presence of Xh and Xs, then this is the final and true answer.
Nothing more need be done. The values picked for y, Xh, and Xs
3The data is available at http:
wmbriggs.com
public
sat.txt.
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are those I, and perhaps nobody else, thought important. A different
decision maker might pick different values.
But suppose I am interested in the relevance of Xh. Its presence is
an assumption, a premise, one that I felt important to make. There
are several things that can be done. The first is to remove it. That
leads to
Pr(Y > 3.8|Xs = 1160, D,Ms) = 0.0075. (4)
Notice first that both (3) and (4) are correct. The probability in (3)
is 5 times larger than in (4). This is a measure of relevance and im-
portance, given y = 3.8 and Xs = 1160. Importance and relevance,
like probability itself, are always conditional on our assumptions. A
second measure of importance is the change in probabilities when Xh
is varied. That can be seen in the following figure.
There is a change from about 0 to 8% over the range of high school
GPAs. If high school GPA was not probative of Y > 3.8 given these
premises then the graph would be flat, indicating no change. In other
words, it would resemble the dashed line, which is (4), the model with-
out high school GPA. Is this “departure” from flatness important?
There is no single answer to this question. That entirely depends on
the uses to which this model is put. If a decision would be made dif-
ferently given these varying values of the probability, then high school
GPA is important, otherwise it is not. The answer is not a matter
of probability or statistics. That the line is not flat is proof, however,
that, given M , y, and Xs, knowledge of high school GPA is relevant to
knowledge of Y .
It cannot be emphasized too strongly that importance and relevance
are conditional, just as probability is. A linear function of high school
GPA added to a regression model already supplied with high school
GPA would be irrelevant. It might be that high school GPA is relevant
or important at some levels of SAT, and irrelevant and unimportant
at others, and the same is true for the goodness measures of SAT.
Information X is not isolated and is related to all the assumptions we
made, and these include the other X in the model.
Now add the information Xw = “hours studied a week” to the model
and create a relevance plot for it.
The (conditional, as always) probability of Y > 3.8 varies little, from
0.038 to about 0.044, a change of only 0.006. Time studying is relevant
because the probability differs from the straight line, which is the prob-
ability using the model sans time studying. But it is important? Given
the values of high school GPA, SAT, and y, the change from 0.038 to
0.044 is small and therefore many decision makers might conclude that
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Figure 1. Pr(Y > 3.8|Xh = x,Xs = 1160, D,Mh,s)
allowing Xh to vary from 1 to 4 in increments of 0.1. The
notation on the figure conditions on E, which is short-
hand for all the evidence we have. The dashed line is
Pr(Y > 3.8|Xs = 1160, D,Ms).
adding time studying provides no benefit to our understanding. Of
course, such a small change might be useful to somebody. It is not the
statistician’s job to decide, but the decision maker’s.
I cheated, because “time studying” isn’t that at all. In fact, it is
made-up numbers using R’s rnorm() and abs() functions. It is there-
fore not surprising that the pertinent probability should vary little.
That it does at all is only because of coincidence. By “coincidence”
I do not mean “randomness” or “chance”, because I know the deter-
minative cause of these numbers, but happenstance, a known lack of
causal connection between the made-up numbers and the observable of
interest. We should add information presumed probative into a model
8 WILLIAM M. BRIGGS
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
0 5 10 15 20 25
0.
03
0
0.
03
5
0.
04
0
0.
04
5
Hours spent studying
Pr
(Y
 > 
3.8
 | E
)
Figure 2. Pr(Y > 3.8|Xh = 3.5, Xs = 1160, Xw =
x,D,Mh,s,w) allowing Xw to vary from 0 to 26. The
notation on the figure conditions on E, which is short-
hand for all the evidence we have. The dashed line is
Pr(Y > 3.8|Xh = 3.5, Xs = 1160, D,Mh,s).
only if we have a plausible belief that the information is related (some-
how) to the cause of the observable of interest. If this connection is
lacking, the information should not be added. Thus “time studying”
should certainly be removed. Understanding causality in probability
models is difficult subject beyond the scope of this paper, except to
emphasize that probability models cannot deduce cause (though be-
cause of hypothesis testing just about everybody thinks they can; see
Briggs [Briggs, 2015] for more details).
The Third Way strategy is to create scenarios that are of direct
interest to a decision maker, the person or persons who will use the
model. Plots like those above can be made at the values of the probative
observables in which the decision maker is interested. There are no one
THE THIRD WAY OF PROBABILITY 9
Table 1. The predictions for Pr(Y < 2|Xh = h,Xs =
s,D,M) and Pr(Y > 3|Xh = h,Xs = s,D,M) for com-
mon values of h and s, and two points of y thought to
be of interest. Every X in the model appears in the
Table.
Pr(Y < 2|h, s,D,M) Pr(Y > 3|h, s,D,M)
h/s 400 800 1200 1600 400 800 1200 1600
0.5 0.99 0.94 0.760 0.4600 3.9e-05 0.00065 0.0093 0.071
1.0 0.98 0.89 0.640 0.3400 1.4e-04 0.00180 0.0200 0.120
1.5 0.95 0.81 0.510 0.2200 5.0e-04 0.00500 0.0420 0.190
2.0 0.90 0.70 0.370 0.1300 1.7e-03 0.01300 0.0820 0.290
2.5 0.83 0.57 0.250 0.0730 5.0e-03 0.03100 0.1500 0.420
3.0 0.73 0.43 0.160 0.0360 1.4e-02 0.06600 0.2400 0.550
3.5 0.61 0.30 0.089 0.0170 3.3e-02 0.13000 0.3700 0.680
4.0 0.48 0.20 0.048 0.0074 6.9e-02 0.22000 0.5000 0.790
set of right or proper values, except in the trivial sense of excluding
values that are, given exterior information, known to be impossible. For
instance, given our knowledge of grade points, the value Xh = −17 is
impossible. Assessing relevance and importance for large models will
not be easy. But who insisted it should be? That classical statistical
procedures now make analysis so simple is part of the problem we’re
trying to correct.
Given the model and old observations, every set of Xh and Xs, at
some y, produce a prediction. For instance, for future students with
Xh = 3.5 and Xs = 1200 the (conditional) probability that Y >
3.8 is 0.045. In regression, incidentally, we do not have to restrict
ourselves to a fixed y, because the model will produce a prediction of
every possible value of Y . These predictions can and must be verified.
An example of such a report is given in Table 1. Considerable art
and thinking will have to go into presenting predictions from a model
loaded with probative X. This may seem like a drawback, but in
fact it is a boon. Far too many models are crammed with extraneous
“controlling variables” the usefulness is scarcely ever considered. This
approach forces such consideration and encourages leanness; which is
to say, models without fat. Lean models are not necessarily small.
The verification strategy is this. A model is built using impor-
tance and relevance, as above. It is then released into the wild, as
it were, to wait for new data to arise. Every new data point will have
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a value of (Xh, Xs, Y ). These are fed into the model and the pre-
diction for the probability of Y is given (with, say, y = Y ). These
prediction-observable pairs are then evaluated in relation to a proper
score and possibly also with respect to a simpler version of the model,
in a move to assess (what is called) model skill. This is called the
verification process. It is what happens naturally in, say, engineering
and physics, where models are forced to meet reality. See, inter alia,
[Gneiting and Raftery, 2007, Murphy, 1991, Murphy and Winkler, 1987,
Briggs and Zaretzki, 2008] for details on verification, an incredibly broad
and rich subject. All that can be done here is to give a hint about the
best tools. At bottom, the best verification is to assess how well the
model performed in the decisions made with it.
Probability leakage is also discoverable [Briggs, 2013]. This is when
the model gives non-zero probability to values of Y which are known
to be impossible given external evidence, evidence which is usually
ignored in the model-building process (regression, for instance, is hor-
ribly over-used). For instance, we learn that at this college a GPA of
4 is the maximum. Yet in our model with (Xh = 4 and Xs = 1400
the probability that Y > 4 is 0.105. This is substantial leakage and a
guarantee of model weakness.
We can also compare our touted model with a simpler model, which
is perhaps a standing competitor or is otherwise natural to consider.
In the example, time spent studying was revealed to be faked. But
suppose I were to give the data to a statistician and not tell him of
the fraud. Time studying sounds plausibly causally related to grade
point. The check of relevance and importance do not excite. Thus it is
reasonable to say two models are in contention, Mh,s,w and Mh,s. If,
considering whatever proper score we are using, Mh,s,w cannot “beat”
Mh,s, Mh,s,w is said not to have skill in relation to Mh,s. This tech-
nique is widely used in meteorology (see the references above). In re-
gression, the so-called null model (only with an “intercept”) is always
available as a comparator.
A popular (but by no means perfect) proper score is the continuous
rank probability score (CRPS), which is the squared distance between
the cumulative distribution function of each prediction and the stair-
case step-function empirical cumulative distribution of each observable
[Gneiting and Raftery, 2007]. Smaller is better. The mean or summed
CRPS is presented over multiple observations, but it can also be exam-
ined for each observation. Skill is a relative measure of improvement in
score, usually (scorefull − scorepartial)/scorepartial, comparing a full
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Figure 3. Top left: the CRPS calculated for each
observation for the full and partial models; a one-to-one
line is over-plotted. Top right: the histograms of CRPS
scores; the partial model is the dashed line. Bottom left:
the skill score for each observation. Bottom right: The
skill plotted for each observation of college grade point.
Skill is had for values greater than 0.
or larger model with a partial, less complex, or otherwise natural com-
parator. A perfect skill is 1; values less than 0 are not skillful. Models
without skill should not be used. Skill, as is obvious, depends on the
score.
The mean CRPS for the “full” model with “time studying” is 0.0734,
while for the “partial” model without it is 0.0749. The skill score is
0.02. This shows the full model is superior, but only just barely. Here
is a per-observation analysis of CRPS and skill.
The first graph in Fig. 3 shows the CRPS calculated for each obser-
vation for the full and partial models; a one-to-one line is over-plotted.
The addition of “time studying” does not lead to uniform improvement.
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Figure 4. Top left: the skill plots for each observation
of high school GPA. Top right: skill for each observation
of SAT. Bottom left: skill for each observation of “time
studying”.
The next graph are histograms of CRPS scores; the partial model is the
dashed line. This is useful for a decision maker deciding how valuable
either model is. Again, the best score is that which is related directly
to the decisions made with the models. Whether CRPS is this score
is situation dependent. The last graph shows the skill score for each
observation of college GPA. A mixed bag, as far as “time studying”
goes. If we didn’t already know, we’d suspect that “time studying”
is not adding much, and is even subtracting from, our knowledge of
college GPA.
In Fig. 4 show the skill plots over each X in the model for each ob-
servation. Skill is had for values greater than 0. The view that “time
studying” is nearly useless is confirmed. The last graph is particularly
revealing. As “time studying” moves to either extreme, the skill bi-
furcates, showing a process that “can’t make up its mind.” If “time
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studying” were truly valuable, the signal would be coherent. At this
point, conferring with the decision maker, the statistician might drop
“time studying” and compare his new “full” model consisting only of
high school GPA and SAT with (perhaps) a “partial” model consisting
only of an “intercept”.
The verification process can be done on the already-observed data as
an initial check on model goodness. The analogy is standard residual
analysis. The same weaknesses apply, however, because the temptation
to tweak the model to produce better verification measures will not be
able to be resisted. Over-fitting and over-confidence will result, as al-
ways, but with an important twist. Since the model will be known and
published in its predictive form, outsiders do not have to trust the in-
sample verification. They can wait for new data and apply verification
on them themselves.
4. Discussion
Once importance or relevance are known, it is a mistake to say that
X is linked to, or is associated with, or predicts Y , or, worse, some
variant of “When X equals x, Y equals y”. These are versions of
a colossal misunderstanding, which is to say X causes Y , It is true
that X determines the uncertainty we have in Y , but determines is
analogical; it has an ontological and epistemological sense. Probability
is only concerned with the latter usage. The only function probability
has is to say how our assumptions X determine epistemologically the
uncertainty we have in Y . If we knew X was a cause of Y , we have no
need of probability.
Importance and relevance are replacements for testing and estima-
tion, but not painless ones. The recipient of an analysis is asked to do
much more work than is usual in statistics. However, this is the more
honest approach. The benefit is that equation (1) answers questions
our customers ask us in the form they expect. The probabilities are in
plain English and painless to interpret. Everything is stated in terms
of observables. Everything is verifiable. The conditions on which the
model relies are made explicit, made bare for all to see and to agree or
disagree with. Gone is the idea that there is one “best” model which
researchers have somehow discovered and which gives unambiguous re-
sults. Gone also is the belief that the statistical analysis has proved a
causal relationship.
The model is made plain so that all can use it for themselves to verify
predictions made with it. Everybody will be able to see for themselves
just how useful the model really is.
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